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STUDENT NOTES 247
fact that negligence to be criminal must be what is classed as reckless
or gross" is not sufficient reason to necessitate a different standard,
which measures the actor's conduct, or even the addition of other sub-
jective elements.2 Requiring negligence to be gross in order to be
criminal is not requiring that the actor have a reckless, careless, oX
culpable state of mind. That negligence to be criminal must be gross
means simply that the actor's negligent conduct must involve such a
high and patent risk of harm to others that society imposes, as an
additional restraining influence, criminal liability. But having made
this analysis, the question that immediately presents itself is, how does
gross negligence furnish the necessary mens rea required in crimes?
Gross negligence which results in homicide is said to be sufficient to
supply2l or to substitute forn intent. Mr. Justice Holmes states, "The
law requires men at their peril to know the teachings of common
experience, just as it requires them to know the law". It is sub-
mitted that the objective standard for determining criminal liability is
In harmony with the modern trend in criminal law to give less con-
sideration to the criminal's intent and to look primarily to the
sociological harm threatened by his behavior.
E. PRESTON YOUNG
CONFLICT OF LAWS-JURISDICTION FOR DIVORCE-EXTRA-
TERRITORIAL VALIDITY OF EX PARTE DIVORCES
For the purpose of this discussion the following hypothetical case
is proposed:
H and W were married in state X where they lived as husband
and wife for several years. H left W in state X and went to state Y
where he established a bona fide domicil. He then sued for a divorce
on the ground of desertion, having service by publication upon his
wife. H obtained a default decree in state Y and later married W
number two. After living with W number two for several years he
died, leaving real property in state X, state Y and state Z. W number
culpable or criminal negligence? What is the test by which criminal
responsibility becomes a consequence of a negligent act? But in his
excellent work, 'Negligence in Law,' vol. 3, p. 7, says: '. . .Between
criminal negligence, however, and actionable negligence, there is no
principle of discrimination, but a question of degree only'."
21Fitzgerald v. State, 112 Ala. 34, 20 So. 966 (1895); People v.
Adams, 289 Ill. 339, 124 N.E. 575 (1919); People v. Sikes, 328 Ill. 64,
159 N.E. 293 (1927); People v. Barnes, 182 Mich. 179, 148 N.W. 400
(1914).
2 Levitt, Extent and Functions of the Doctrine of Mens Rea, (1923)
17 Ill. L.R. 578: "At the present time, I think, the subjective aspect is
practically eliminated as an element of any specific crime, and main-
tains whatever hold it has because of the idea that a crime is an act
for which the offender must be punished."
2Id. at 578-79.
27People v. Barnes, 182 Mich. 179, 148 N.W. 400 (1914) "....
equivalent to a criminal intent". 12 Harv. L.R. (1899) 428.
"Holmes, supra note 8, at 57. Accord: Com. v. Pierce, 138 Mass.
165, 179 (1884).
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two had dower granted her in property in state Y and later W number
one brought suit to have dower allotted to her in the real property in
state X. The court in state X granted W number one dower holding
that H was in fault in his separation from W number one and that the
divorce in state Y was invalid. Subsequently W number one sues to
have dower allotted in the real property in state Z, W number two
being made defendant and appearing in the action. Query: Which of
these two women is entitled to the real property in state Z?
There are two possible solutions to this case based on the decision
of the United States Supreme Court in Haddock v. Haddock.' Assuming
that the right to dower depended upon which of these claimants state
Z should recognize as the wife of H at the time of his death, these
solutions are stated, and will be followed by discussions of the two
solutions in the order in which they are stated.
1. The courts of state Y had jurisdiction to render a binding
divorce if the marital status had acquired a situs in that state. The
determination of whether the marriage relation had ever acquired such
a situs is made dependent upon who was at fault in the separation In
state X.'
2. The marriage relation is composed of a number of legal Inci-
dents. Certain of these legal incidents followed H to state Y and state
Y had jurisdiction of so many of these legal incidents as were within
that state. Therefore, state Y could render a divorce decree which
would permit H to remarry in that state, but it could not render a
decree that 'would affect the legal incidents of the marriage which
remained with W in state X, such as her right to dower in her hus-
band's property2
The following reasoning would seem to justify the first solution:
In Haddock v. Haddock,' the facts were similar to the facts of our
hypothetical case. Mr. and Mrs. Haddock were married in New York
and lived there until Mr. Haddock left and went to Connecticut where
he established a domicil and obtained a divorce from Mrs. Haddock,
having service by publication upon her. Later Mrs. Haddock instituted
a divorce action in New York having personal service upon Mr. Had-
dock in 2ew York. Mr. Haddock set up the Connecticut decree as a
defense. On appeal the Supreme Court held that New York was not
bound to extend full faith and credit to the Connecticut decree, and that
the New York divorce was valid.
Divorce actions were early held to be in rem actions, the marital
status being the res.5 Consequently the court which had jurisdiction
of the marital status could render a binding decree upon constructive
service. As a status can have no actual situs, domicil was hit upon to
2201 U.S. 562 (1905).
2This solution is based on Restatement, Conflict of Laws (1934)
section 113.
3This solution is discussed in the note immediately following.
ISupra n. 1.
5Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903); Hughes v. Hughes, 211
Ky. 799, 278 S.W. 121 (1925); Ditson v. Ditson, 4 R.I. 87 (1856).
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determine the situs of the marital status. Since at common law the
wife took the domicil of the husband, the marital status was considered
as having its situs at the domicil of the husband. But the United
States Supreme Court decided in Cheever v. Wilson,6 that if the husband
was at fault In the marital separation, then the wife was under no duty
to be with him and she could establish a separate domicil for the pur-
pose of obtaining a divorce.' This case reached a common sense result.
When a husband has given cause for divorce, then the wife is certainly
under no duty to be at his domicil, and may keep sufficient of the
marital status with her to give the court where she is domiciled juris-
diction of that res.
If Haddock v. Haddock decided anything it decided that the New
York Court had jurisdiction to pass upon the fault of the parties and
to render a valid divorce. That being so, as the New York Court had
both parties before it, personal service having been had upon the hus-
band In New York,8 the determination of the New York Court as to the
fault of the parties was conclusive upon both parties.0
Haddock v. Haddock decided, then, that a husband who was at
fault could not take sufficient of the marital status with him into another
state to give that other state jurisdiction in rem of the marriage rela-
tion. 0 The rule earlier applied to the wife was applied by the Supreme
Court to the husband in Haddock v. Haddock, which held that the
marital status stayed with the party not in fault in the marital
separation."
09 Wall. 108 (1852).
1"Where the domicile of matrimony is in a particular state, and
the husband, abandoning the wife, wrongfully goes into another state
in order to avoid his marital obligation, such other state does not
become a new domicile of matrimony, nor the actual or constructive
domicile of the wife. That (the matrimonial domicile and that of the
wife) continues in the original state until she actually acquires a new
one." Barber v. Barber, 21 How. 582 (1858).
' It is important to note that the husband was personally served
in New York.
' The mere fact that Mr. Haddock appeared in the New York action
did not give the New York Court jurisdiction of the divorce action, but
if his fault in his separation from Mrs. Haddock was a jurisdictional
fact, the New York Court could pass upon this question of fact and
determine it finally. Evidence will always be admitted to disprove a
jurisdictional fact upon which the judgment of a foreign court was
based. Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457 (1873). And if the juris-
dictional fact is once litigated by the defendant the question of
jurisdiction becomes res adjudicata. Hanna v. Stedman, 230 N.Y. 326,
130 N.E. 566 (1921); 2 Beale, Conflict of Laws, (1935) section 450.9.
11 "As the husband, after wrongfully abandoning the wife in New
York, never established a matrimonial domicile in Connecticut, it can-
not be said that he took with him the marital relation from which he
fled to Connecticut." Justice White in Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S.
562, 577 (1905).
11 The Texas court in speaking of Haddock v. Haddock in Mont-
morency v. Montmorency, 139 S.W. (Tex. 1911) 1168, 1171 said: "The
decision Impresses us with the belief that the reasoning of that decision
gives the court of the domicile of the innocent party jurisdiction to
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In our hypothetical case there had never been a determination of
the fault of the parties by a court which was capable of binding both
the parties upon the question of fault. If H was not in fault in his
separation from his first wife in state X, W number one was under a
duty to follow him to state Y.- If she failed to follow him under those
circumstances, the marital status was legally with the husband in state
Y. But if H was at fault, then Hadaock v. Haddock is authority for
the proposition that the marital status had never acquired a situs In
state Y and that that court was without jurisdiction in rem. Such a
result is desirable in that it prevents one spouse from deserting the
other and going -to a distant state and there bringing an action for
divorce which will cut off the economic rights of the other spouse with-
out an adequate opportunity to be heard, regardless of who was at
fault in the marital separation.
The determination of whether H was at fault when he left W in
state X, then, is a jurisdictional fact.1'
Where a court's jurisdiction depends upon the determination of a
fact, this fact may be inquired into by the courts of other states when
a judgment so obtained is sought to be enforced in a foreign state;"
and the finding of any court is not res adjudicata unless both parties
are personally before the court making the determination.'
The court in state Z should hear evidence with regard to who was
at fault in the separation in state X, and if according to the evidence
this court finds that H was at fault, then the divorce decree rendered
in state Y is not binding upon the courts of state Z, but if it finds that
W number one was at fault in the separation, then the court should
recognize the validity of the decree rendered in state Y and grant dower
to W number two.
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render a judgment binding everywhere, and deprives the court of the
domicile of the guilty party of jurisdiction to render a judgment
binding save in the state where rendered." This statement is quoted
with approval in Parker v. Parker, 222 Fed. 186, 191 (1915).
In Parker v. Parker, 222 Fed. 186 (1915) [Certiorari denied 239
U.S. 643 (1915)]. H and W were married and lived as husband and
wife in California. H left and went to Missouri where he established
a domicil and obtained a divorce from W, having service by publica-
tion on W. Thirty-one years later, after H had remarried and moved
to Texas and died in that state, W number one sued for dower in
property which H left in Texas. The court made a thorough examina-
tion into the fact of who was at fault in the California separation and
finding that H was at fault granted dower to W number one, the court
saying at page 190: "Ascertaining, moreover, from the evidence the
motive and reasons for his desertion of the complainant the chancellor
summarizes the proof fairly borne out by the record:
'That Walter M. Parker did not take the matrimonial domicile of
himself and complainant to the state of Missouri, and the complainant
was never actually or constructively within the territorial limits of
that state.'"
13 Supra n. 11.
24Supra n. 9.
"Ibid.
